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Abstract 
Newton described his Principia as a work of ‘experimental philosophy’, where theories 
were deduced from phenomena.  He introduced six ‘phenomena’: propositions 
describing patterns of motion, generalised from astronomical observations.  However, 
these don’t fit Newton’s contemporaries’ definitions of ‘phenomenon’.  Drawing on 
Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) distinction between data, phenomena and theories, I 
argue that Newton’s ‘phenomena’ were explanatory targets drawn from raw data.  
Viewed in this way, the phenomena of the Principia and the experiments from the Opticks 
were different routes to the same end: isolating explananda. 
0 Introduction 
Newton described his Principia as ‘experimental philosophy’: theories were deduced from 
phenomena, rather than speculations.  For example, in the General Scholium, which 
concluded later editions of Principia, he wrote: 
In this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from phenomena and are made general 
by induction.  The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and the 
law of gravity have been found by this method (Newton, 1999: 943). 
This passage refers to the six phenomena listed at the start of book 3 of Principia.  These 
propositions described patterns of motion, generalised from observations of the planets, 
earth and moon.  It has been noted by many commentators, however, that these do not 
seem to fit any standard definition of ‘phenomenon’.1  Some have argued that Newton’s 
labelling was mistaken, while others have argued that Newton was using the label 
‘phenomenon’ to avoid using the term ‘hypothesis’, which would mark his work as 
speculative, rather than experimental (Davies, 2009: 217).2 
                                                 
1 See for example, (Densmore, 1995), (Harper, 2011) and (Shapiro, 2004). 
2 See (Anstey, 2005) for the early modern distinction between experimental and speculative 
philosophy. 
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I argue that Newton’s choice of label was appropriate, albeit unconventional.  Firstly, 
drawing on Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) distinction between data, phenomena and 
theories, I argue that Newton’s phenomena performed a specific function: they isolated 
explanatory targets.  Secondly, I draw some comparisons between Newton’s Opticks and 
his Principia.  In the Opticks, Newton isolated his explanatory targets by making 
observations under controlled, experimental conditions.  In Principia, Newton isolated his 
explanatory targets mathematically: from astronomical data, he calculated the motions of 
bodies relative to an isolated system.  Viewed in this way, the phenomena of the Principia 
and the experiments from the Opticks are different routes to the same end: specifying the 
explananda.  I conclude that Newton was not in error, nor using experimentalist rhetoric 
simply for political reasons.3  He was, however, bending the meaning of commonly used 
terms to his own needs. 
1 The Phenomena of Principia 
Principia book 3 contained six phenomena:4 
                                                 
3 Whether Newton’s Principia should be considered a work of experimental philosophy by the 
standards of his contemporaries is beyond my scope here. 
4 The six phenomena of Principia originated as ‘hypotheses’ in the first edition.  Of the nine 
hypotheses stated in the first edition, five of them were re-labelled ‘phenomena’ in the second edition, and 
Newton added one more (phenomenon 2). 
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Phenomenon 1 The circumjovial planets, by radii drawn to the centre of Jupiter, describe areas 
proportional to the times, and their periodic times – the fixed stars being at rest 
– are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from that centre. 
Phenomenon 2 The circumsaturnian planets, by radii drawn to the centre of Saturn, describe 
areas proportional to the times, and their periodic times – the fixed stars being 
at rest – are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from that centre. 
Phenomenon 3 The orbits of the five primary planets – Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and 
Saturn – encircle the sun. 
Phenomenon 4 The periodic times of the five primary planets and of either the sun about the 
earth or the earth about the sun – the fixed stars being at rest – are as the 3/2 
powers of their mean distances from the sun. 
Phenomenon 5 The primary planets, by radii drawn to the earth, describe areas in no way 
proportional to the times but, by radii drawn to the sun, traverse areas 
proportional to the times. 
Phenomenon 6 The moon, by a radius drawn to the centre of the earth, describes areas 
proportional to the times. 
Table 1 Phenomena from Principia (Newton, 1999: 797-801) 
There are several things to notice about these phenomena.  Firstly, they are distinct 
from data: they describe continuing patterns of motion, rather than particular 
observations or measurements.  So, while the phenomena are detected and supported by 
astronomical observations, they are not observed or perceived directly. 
Secondly, they are distinct (to put it somewhat anachronistically) from noumena: they 
describe the motions of bodies, but not the causes of those motions, nor the substance of 
bodies. 
Thirdly, they describe relative motions of bodies: in each case, the orbit is described 
around a fixed point.  For example, phenomenon 1 takes Jupiter as a stationary body for 
the purposes of the proposition.  In phenomena 4 and 5, Jupiter is taken to be in motion 
around a stationary sun. 
Fourthly, these phenomena do not prioritise the observer.  Rather, each motion is 
described from the ideal standpoint of the centre of the relevant system: the satellites of 
Jupiter and Saturn are described from the standpoints of Jupiter and Saturn respectively, 
the primary planets are described from the standpoint of the sun, and the moon is 
described from the standpoint of the Earth.  Furthermore, because Newton doesn’t 
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prioritise the observer, effects such as phases and retrograde motions of the planets are 
not phenomena but only evidence of phenomena.5 
Newton’s use of the label ‘phenomena’ is somewhat puzzling, because these do not 
fit any standard definition.  Densmore has pointed out that: 
Despite what might be suggested by their title, these ‘Phenomena’ are not directly observed, but 
rather are conclusions based on observations…  They invoke not just observations, but planetary 
theory in current use by the astronomers of his time (Densmore, 1995: 307). 
Densmore identifies two problems with Newton’s choice of label.  Firstly, the 
phenomena are not directly observed.  Secondly, the phenomena are informed by 
astronomical theory. 
Let’s see how the term ‘phenomenon’ was explicitly defined in the eighteenth 
century.  Firstly, in the 1708 edition of his Lexicon Technicum, John Harris gave the 
following definition: 
Phænomenon, in Natural Philosophy, signifies any Appearance, Effect, or Operation of a Natural 
Body, which offers its self to the Consideration and Solution of an Enquirer into Nature (Harris, 
1708). 
In 1736, this definition was updated: 
Phænomenon [...] is in Physicks an extraordinary Appearance in the Heavens or on Earth; 
discovered by the observation of the Celestial Bodies, or by Physical Experiments the Cause of 
which is not obvious (Harris, 1736). 
And in the 1771 edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, Colin Macfarquhar and Andrew 
Bell said: 
Phænomenon, in philosophy, denotes any remarkable appearance, whether in the heavens or on 
earth; and whether discovered by observation or experiments (Macfarquhar & Bell, 1771). 
                                                 
5 Newton used the phases of the planets to support phenomenon 3 (Newton, 1999: 799), and the 
retrograde motions of the planets to support phenomenon 5 (Newton, 1999: 799). 
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These definitions emphasise observed appearance.  We have seen that Newton’s phenomena 
describe relative motions from an ideal standpoint.  They are, then, effects, but not 
appearances.  So they don’t fit the above definitions in any straightforward way.6 
This reveals an interesting methodological feature of Newton’s phenomena.  
Traditionally, ‘phenomenon’ seems to have been synonymous with both ‘appearance’ and 
‘explanandum’.  For example, the ancient Greeks were concerned to construct a system 
that explained and preserved the motions of the celestial bodies as they appeared to 
terrestrial observers (Duhem, 1969).  2000 years later, Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine 
argued over whether a heliocentric or geocentric system provided a better fit and 
explanation of these appearances (Duhem, 1969).  This suggests that, traditionally, 
philosophers did not distinguish between phenomena and data.  For Newton, however, 
these come apart.  The six phenomena of Principia describe the motions of celestial 
bodies, but not as they appear to terrestrial observers.  In this sense, they are not 
appearances, but they do require an explanation. 
Phenomena had an important role in Newton’s methodology.  Passages such as the 
one I opened with are littered throughout Newton’s writings.  Moreover, Newton’s 
emphasis on the empirical basis of his natural philosophy is an important feature of his 
methodology.  So it seems reasonable to expect that Newton was working with a distinct 
notion of ‘phenomenon’.  In fact, Newton considered including a list of definitions in 
book 3 of the Principia.7  ‘Phenomena’ was going to be definition I8: 
Phenomena I call whatever can be perceived, either things external which become known through 
the five senses, or things internal which we contemplate in our minds by thinking.  As fire is hot, 
water is wet, gold is heavy, the sun is luminous, I am and I think.  All these are sensible things and 
                                                 
6 In philosophy nowadays, the term ‘phenomenon’ has a variety of uses, such as: (a) A particular fact, 
occurrence, or change, which is perceived or observed, the cause or explanation of which is in question; (b) 
An immediate object of sensation or perception; and (c) An exceptional or unaccountable thing, fact or 
occurrence.  These do not resemble Newton’s usage. 
7 Among the draft manuscript material relating to the second edition of Principia (MS. Add. 3965), 
there are definitions of ‘body’, ‘vacuum’, ‘force’ and ‘phenomena’. 
8 Editing marks on the manuscripts show that this was initially intended to be ‘Definition III’, but 
Newton frequently revised the ordering of the definitions before eventually abandoning them. 
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can be called phenomena in a wide sense.  Those things are properly called phenomena which can 
be seen but I take the word in a wider sense.9 
This definition does not include, among its examples, the motions of the planets.  In 
fact, the examples provided do not look like Newton’s six phenomena at all.  It is true 
that these examples are generalised, so they are not data.  Moreover, they are observable, 
so they are not noumena.  But they are not relativized or idealised in any important 
sense.  Rather, they can be acquired fairly directly via sensory experience.  In contrast, 
Newton’s six phenomena are not the sorts of effects or occurrences that can become known 
through the five senses alone, nor are they things that we contemplate in our minds by thinking.  
Rather, they describe patterns of behaviour, isolated and relativized by reference to 
theory.  So Newton’s six phenomena stretch his own putative definition. 
2 Bogen & Woodward on ‘Phenomena’ 
As we have seen, Newton’s use of ‘phenomena’ is unusual: they are not observational 
data in the sense meant by his contemporaries (or himself, in draft definitions).  Was he 
then wrong or disingenuous?  In this section I introduce Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) 
account of scientific reasoning, which ultimately vindicates Newton’s use of 
‘phenomena’. 
Bogen and Woodward have argued for an account of science in which data, 
phenomena and theory provide three levels of scientific explanation (Bogen & 
Woodward, 1988: 305-306) (see figure 1 below). 
                                                 
9 MS. Add. 3965, f.422v (my translation).  In the interest of clarity, I have flouted convention by 
omitting Newton’s editing marks. 
 7 
Figure 1 Bogen & Woodward’s 3-tiered account of science 
By the account, data are records produced by measurement and experiment that 
serve as evidence or features of phenomena.  For example, bubble chamber 
photographs, discharge patterns in electronic particle detectors, and records of reaction 
times and error rates in psychological experiments.  Phenomena are features of the world 
that in principle could recur under different contexts or conditions.  For example, weak 
neutral currents, proton decay, and chunking and recency effects in human memory.  
Theories are explanations10 of the phenomena. 
Bogen and Woodward argue that explanatory theories provide systematic 
explanations of the phenomena, but don’t explain the data.  This is because data reflects 
causal influences beyond the explanatory target, while a phenomenon reflects a single, or 
small, manageable number of causal influences (Bogen & Woodward, 1988: 321-322).  
Consider the relationship between the Eddington experiment and General Relativity.  In 
the Eddington experiment, a cluster of stars was photographed from a boat in the middle 
of the ocean, during a solar eclipse.  These were then compared to photographs taken 
earlier under less turbulent conditions.  The experiment captured the phenomenon of the 
displacement of starlight as it travels past the sun.  General relativity explained the 
phenomenon, but did not explain the workings of the cameras, optical telescopes, and so 
on, that causally influenced the data. 
                                                 
10 Bogen and Woodward take theories to be detailed systematic explanations, as opposed to singular-
causal explanations (Bogen & Woodward, 1988: 322 n.17). 
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To summarise, on Bogen and Woodward’s account, ‘phenomenon’ is defined 
functionally by its relationship to data and theory.  Phenomena have the following features: 
1. Distinct from data; 
2. Inferred from data; 
3. Describe isolated patterns; and 
4. Explananda. 
Bogen and Woodward do not consider Newton’s work in their paper.  However, in the 
next section, I show that we can characterise Newton’s phenomena in such terms. 
3 Turning observations into explananda 
I now discuss the relationship between observations, phenomena and theorems in 
Newton’s Principia, using phenomenon 1 as my case study.  Firstly, I argue that Newton 
implicitly distinguished between observations and phenomena in a way that maps onto 
Bogen and Woodward’s explicit distinction between data and phenomena.  Secondly, I 
argue that Newton’s phenomena perform the same supporting role for theorems as 
Bogen and Woodward’s phenomena perform for theories. 
Phenomenon 1 states that, with Jupiter at the centre, Jupiter’s moons follow the area 
rule (see figure 2 below) and the harmonic rule (see figure 3 below) in relation to Jupiter.  
These patterns of motion are generalised from astronomical observation.  Notice that 
phenomenon 1 treats Jupiter and its moons as an isolated system: Jupiter is a stationary 
body, and the motions of the moons of Jupiter are described in terms of their 
relationship to Jupiter. 
  
Figure 2 The Area Rule Figure 3 The Harmonic Rule 
Consider how Newton obtained this phenomenon.  To support the first part of this 
phenomenon, that Jupiter’s moons describe areas proportional to their times around 
Jupiter, Newton said: 
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This is established from astronomical observations.  The orbits of these planets [i.e. the moons of 
Jupiter] do not differ sensibly from circles concentric with Jupiter, and their motions in these circles 
are found to be uniform (Newton, 1999). 
In other words, the moons of Jupiter maintain constant distances from Jupiter.  
Moreover, they maintain a constant speed as they orbit Jupiter.  So the moons of Jupiter 
maintain uniform circular motion, with Jupiter as the geometric centre.  Therefore, they 
follow the area rule. 
To support the second part of this phenomenon, that the periodic times of Jupiter’s 
moons are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from Jupiter, Newton provided the 
following table: 
Periodic times of the satellites of Jupiter 
 1d18h27'34" 3d13h13'42" 7d3h42'36" 16d16h32'9" 
Distances of the satellites from the centre of Jupiter in semidiameters of Jupiter 
 1 2 3 4 
From the observations of     
Borelli 52/3 82/3 14 242/3 
Towneley (by micrometer) 5.52 8.78 13.47 24.72 
Cassini (by telescope) 5 8 13 23 
Cassini (by eclips. satell.) 52/3 9 1423/60 253/10 
From the periodic times 5.667 9.017 14.384 25.299 
Table 2 Astronomical observations of the satellites of Jupiter (Newton, 1999: 797). 
Newton took the periodic time of each of the four moons, in days, hours, minutes and 
seconds, and the distance of each moon from Jupiter, in semidiameters of Jupiter.  The 
periodic times were from observations, as were the first four rows of distances.  The final 
row of distances were calculated from the observed periodic times and the harmonic 
rule.  This row illustrates the ‘fit’ between the expected distance (assuming the harmonic 
rule) and the observed distance. 
These are not ‘pure data’; their calculation involves extensive observational and 
theoretical work.11  However, I argue they perform the role of data in Bogen and 
Woodward’s sense.  Firstly, as we have seen, they are the observational records from 
which the phenomena are drawn.  Secondly, they contain more causal influences than the 
phenomena.  Consider the latter point in more detail. 
                                                 
11 See (Densmore, 1995: 310-321). 
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In the Principia Newton indicated that the observations in table 2 above reflect a 
number of causal influences besides gravity.  For instance, he explained how these 
calculations were obtained: 
Using the best micrometers, Mr. Pound has determined the elongations of the satellites of Jupiter 
and the diameter of Jupiter in the following way... (Newton, 1999: 797) 
He went on to explain that the measurement of the diameter of Jupiter varied with the 
length of the telescope, because 
...the light of Jupiter is somewhat dilated by its nonuniform refrangibility, and this dilation has a 
smaller ratio to the diameter of Jupiter in longer and more perfect telescopes than in shorter and 
less perfect ones (Newton, 1999: 798). 
This illustrates Bogen and Woodward’s notion that data shifts to phenomena.  By 
attending to his theory about telescopes, Newton manipulated the data to control for 
distortion.  So we can think of the observations as ‘data’ in a methodological sense: they are 
records from which phenomenal patterns can be drawn. 
I now turn to the role of phenomenon 1 in Principia.  Phenomenon 1 was employed 
(in conjunction with proposition 2 or 3, book 1, and corollary 6 to proposition 4, book 1) 
to support proposition 1, theorem 1, book 3: 
The forces by which the circumjovial planets are continually drawn away from rectilinear motions and are maintained 
in their respective orbits are directed to the centre of Jupiter and are inversely as the squares of the distances of their 
places from that centre (Newton, 1999: 802). 
This proposition states that the motions of the moons of Jupiter are maintained by a 
centripetal force directed towards the centre of Jupiter, and this force decreases with the 
square of the distances of the moons from Jupiter. 
This inference can be reconstructed as follows (see appendix for more detail): 
P1. For all bodies x, if x exhibits a motion M, then M is caused by a force F. 
(established mathematically in book 1) 
P2. Bodies j1, j2, …, jn exhibit motion M. (phenomenon 1) 
C. The motions of bodies j1, j2, …, jn are caused by force F. (proposition 1 book 3) 
P1 is stated in prose, but is a mathematical theorem.  It is a conditional, stating the 
relationship between the motion of a body around a point and the direction and strength 
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of the force that causes that motion.  P2 describes the patterns of motion exhibited by 
the moons of Jupiter, but not the causes of that motion.  Given that P2 satisfies the 
antecedent condition of P1, we can infer the consequent, C, from P1 and P2.12 
Proposition 1 theorem 1 book 3 doesn’t contain any information about the sizes or 
positions of Jupiter’s moons, or the workings of telescopes.  So, while it gives a causal 
explanation for the phenomenon, it gives no direct explanation of the observations.  
That is, given the number of causal influences on such observations, it would be 
impossible to predict the apparent positions of the moons of Jupiter in the sky at a specific time 
from proposition 1 alone.  This is yet more evidence that, in the Principia, observations 
and phenomena are methodologically distinct.  Moreover, this supports my reading of 
Newton’s observations as data. 
And so, Newton implicitly distinguished between observations, phenomena and 
theorems in a way that maps onto Bogen and Woodward’s account.  We saw this firstly 
in Newton’s discussion of the observations, and secondly, in the role phenomenon 1 
played in inferring proposition 1.13 
4 Experiments in the Opticks 
We have seen that the phenomena of the Principia provided the empirical evidence that 
licensed Newton’s inference from mathematical to physical theorems.  I shall now draw 
some comparisons between the Principia and Newton’s other great work, the Opticks. 
In the Opticks book 1, Newton employed a method of ‘proof by experiments’ to 
support his propositions.  Each experiment was introduced to reveal a specific property 
of light.  Using proposition 1 part I as my example, I shall explore this role for 
experiment. 
Proposition 1 part I: 
Lights which differ in Colour, differ also in Degrees of Refrangibility (Newton, 1952: 20). 
                                                 
12 See (Fox, 1999, Harper, 1990, Stein, 1990) for discussions of deductive nomological argument in 
Newton’s Principia. 
13 Phenomena 2-6 provided a similar kind of support for other propositions in book 3. 
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Newton provided two experiments to support this proposition.  In experiment 1 
Newton drew a line down the centre of a piece of black card, and painted one half red 
and the other half blue.  Then he used sunlight to illuminate the card, and peered at the 
card through a prism, which he held close to his eyes (see figure 4 below).  When he 
tilted the prism upwards, the card appeared to move upwards, the blue half (dg) 
appearing higher than the red half (fe).  When he tilted the prism downwards, the card 
appeared to move downwards, the blue half (δν) appearing lower than the red half (φε).  
From this experiment, Newton concluded that the blue light refracts to a greater degree 
than the red light, and hence the blue light is more refrangible than the red light: 
Wherefore in both Cases the Light which comes from the blue half of the Paper through the Prism 
to the Eye, does in like Circumstances suffer a greater Refraction than the Light which comes from 
the red half, and by consequences is more refrangible (Newton, 1952: 21). 
 
Figure 4 Opticks, Book 1 part I, figure 11 
In experiment 2, Newton took the same piece of card and wound “a slender Thred 
of very black Silk” (Newton, 1952: 23) around it, so that several horizontal black lines 
passed across the colours.  He stood the card upright against a wall, so that the colours 
stood vertically, side-by-side, and used a candle to illuminate it (since he performed this 
experiment at night).  He placed a glass lens at a distance of six feet (“and one or two 
Inches” (Newton, 1952: 23)) from the card, and used it to project the light coming from 
the illuminated card onto a piece of white paper which was at the same distance from the 
lens on the other side (see figure 5 below).  He moved the piece of white paper to and 
fro, taking precise note where and when the red and blue parts of the image were most 
distinct (the purpose of the black thread was to indicate distinctness: the image was most 
distinct when the lines created by the thread were sharpest).  He found that when the red 
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part of the image appeared most distinct, the blue part was faint and blurred; and when 
the blue part of the image was most distinct, the red part was faint and blurred.  And 
that, in order to obtain a distinct red image, the paper had to be held 1.5 inches further 
away than it was to obtain a distinct blue image.  He concluded: 
In like Incidences therefore of the blue and red upon the Lens, the blue was refracted more by the 
Lens than the red, so as to converge sooner by an Inch and a half, and therefore is more refrangible 
(Newton, 1952: 25). 
 
Figure 5 Opticks, Book 1 part I, figure 12 
In the scholium that followed, Newton pointed out that the red and blue light in 
these experiments were not strictly homogeneous.  Rather, both colours were, to some 
extent, heterogeneous mixtures of different colours.  So it was not the case, when 
conducting these experiments, that all the blue light was more refrangible than all the red 
light.  And yet, these experiments demonstrate a general effect: 
But these Rays, in proportion to the whole Light, are but few, and serve to diminish the Event of 
the Experiment, but are not able to destroy it (Newton, 1952: 26). 
This highlights the fact that, here, Newton was describing ideal experiments in which the 
target system had been perfectly isolated.14 
This discussion of Newton’s phenomena reveals some continuity in Newton’s 
methodology.  The point of Newton’s articulation of the phenomena in the Principia is the 
same as his observations and experiments in the Opticks.  Both identify and isolate a 
pattern or regularity.  In the Opticks, Newton isolated his explanatory targets by making 
observations under controlled, experimental conditions.  In Principia, Newton isolated his 
                                                 
14 The examples I have just discussed are particularly clear cases of the ‘proof by experiment’.  There 
is variation amongst the experiments Newton introduces, but the general point holds. 
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explanatory targets mathematically: from astronomical data, he calculated the motions of 
bodies with respect to a central focus.  Viewed in this way, Newton’s phenomena and 
experiments are different ways of achieving the same thing: isolating explananda. 
5 Conclusion 
I have argued that Newton works with an implicit distinction between observation, 
phenomenon and theorem that maps onto Bogen and Woodward’s explicit distinction 
between data, phenomena and theory.  This, I take it, ought to be seen as grist for Bogen 
and Woodward’s mill: they certainly do not attend to early modern examples in their 
discussion of their three-way picture of science.  It may be that Newton’s work is an early 
manifestation of the important distinction between ‘data’ and ‘phenomena’. 
My analysis has revealed several interesting features of Newton’s methodology.  
Firstly, we saw that there is a continuity between Newton’s Principia and his Opticks: 
Newton’s phenomena and experiments are different ways of achieving the same thing: 
isolating explananda.  Secondly, we saw that, while traditionally there was no real 
difference between phenomena and data, for Newton, these come apart. 
Finally, Newton’s use of ‘phenomenon’ fits, what I call, his ‘rhetorical style’.  
Newton took the already familiar term and stretched it to fit his methodology.  It is well 
known that Newton did this with many of his innovative philosophical ideas, such as 
‘force’ and ‘mass’.  However, I argue that this is also a feature of many of Newton’s 
methodological concepts: he ‘borrowed’ familiar terms and ‘massaged’ them to fit his 
own needs.  Steffen Ducheyne has argued that Newton did this with his dual-methods of 
analysis and synthesis (Ducheyne, 2012: 5).  Because Newton bends both terms and 
concepts to fit his needs, it is a mistake to focus too closely on definitions.  We should 
instead understand his methodology in terms of the roles which concepts play.  No one, 
not even Newton, explicitly stated that ‘phenomena’ were idealised explananda, isolated 
from much of the causal chaos that attends observations.  Nonetheless, my analysis 
reveals that Newton used them as such.  It seems therefore, that, when discussing 
Newton’s methodology, we should emphasize divisions and functions over definitions. 
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Appendix: Newton’s inference to Proposition 1 Book 3  
A longer reconstruction of this argument is as follows: 
P1. If a body around a point obeys the area rule in relation to that point, then the 
motion of that body is maintained by a centripetal force directed toward that 
point.  (Proposition 2 book 1) 
P2. The moons of Jupiter around Jupiter obey the area rule in relation to Jupiter. 
(1st part of phenomenon 1 book 3) 
C1. The motions of the circumjovial planets are maintained by a centripetal force 
directed toward Jupiter. (1st part of proposition 1 book 3 – from P1 & P2) 
P3. If a body around a point follows the harmonic rule in relation to that point, 
then the centripetal force directed towards that point is inversely as the square 
of the distance from that point.  (Corollary 6, proposition 4 book 1) 
P4. The moons of Jupiter around Jupiter follow the harmonic rule in relation to 
Jupiter. (2nd part of phenomenon 1 book 3) 
C2. For each moon of Jupiter, the centripetal force directed towards the centre of 
Jupiter is inversely as the square of the distance of that moon from the centre 
of Jupiter.  (2nd part of proposition 1 book 3 – from P3 & P4) 
 
 
 
